A voting power analysis was made to estimate the power of IMF members within the Executive Board and the Fund in general through the existing constituency system.
A member's voting power is commonly viewed as a share of the total votes belonging to them. However, such an intuitive statement is often inconsistent with the factual situation. Let us look at a real-world example.
Since the beginning of the Fund's functioning (end of 1945) the IMF has changed a lot, which were effected in three amendments to the Articles of Agreement [3] .
The results of the amendments were the following: the conventional monetary unit (a Special Drawing Right, SDR) was introduced; the hard connection between the exchange rates and gold was removed as well as the requirement of mandatory consultations for determining a member's exchange rate; the way of suspension of the right to vote and several other rights for the countries not complying with their obligations by the Articles of Agreement was adopted.
There is a quota calculated for each member of the IMF, based on the member's relative economic and financial power. 6 For every country the quota defines the size of financial contribution (a member's subscription), the number of votes, the conditions of access to the Fund's reserves and participation in the SDR allocations. Quotas are measured in SDRs. An SDR is the measure unit of the IMF and is also used as a base for a unit by a number of international and national organisations. The SDR value is determined daily by a basket of currencies, nowadays consisting of the euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and US dollar.
Every IMF member has 250 basic votes plus 1 additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to 100 000 SDRs.
The Governance of the Fund
The IMF is governed by the Board of Governors comprising one Governor and one Alternate from each member country. The decisions in the Board are taken by a simple majority voting for most cases except some special ones where the qualified majority voting 7 of 70% and 85% is used. Every Governor casts the number of votes allotted to their state as a unit and cannot split the vote.
The administration and maintenance of the Fund are vested in the Managing Director and the Executive Board, of which 24 Executive Directors (EDs) and Alternate Executive Directors, (AEDs) comprise the main staff. 8 It's worth mentioning that ''By-Laws of the IMF'' 9 and ''Rules and Regulations of the IMF'' 10 allow the Chairman to ''ordinarily ascertain the sense of the meeting in lieu of a formal vote'', and in the decision making process in the Executive Board this method is recommended and widely used; therefore, officially almost all decisions are reached by consensus. However, in practice this ''consensus'' means accepting the decision when informally the agreement of the required majority is met [9] , that is why we assume that voting takes place for any ballot, either explicit or not, which is of no importance for us in this paper.
Let us consider the structure of the Executive Board in details.
As was already noted, the Executive Board consists of 24 EDs. Five of them are appointed by the countries with the largest quotas (the USA, Japan, Germany, France and the UK), while the remaining nineteen are elected by the members of the Board of Governors who do not represent the abovementioned five states in the IMF.
There are several rules in electing the Executive Directors in the Articles of Agreement [3] , 11 of which we would like to emphasise the following: -In balloting for the Executive Directors to be elected, each of the Governors eligible to vote shall cast for one person all of the votes to which he is entitled under Article XII, Section 5(a). -No person who received less than four percent of the total number of votes that can be cast (eligible votes) shall be considered elected.
The analysis framework
We suppose that the IMF is, to a large extent, governed by the Executive Board, 15 so that we have chosen this body for the voting power analysis.
We introduce a somewhat simplified model of the Executive Board. The members of the Fund are aiming at maximisation of their power in the Executive Board:
• At the level of constituencies.
• At the level of the Executive Board.
As a result the transitions between constituencies changing the constituency membership may occur and such precedents are known to the Fund. 16 
The assumptions used
To determine the rule of decision making 17 in the Executive Board we separately consider all 3 cases of a quota used. For the decision making process at the constituency level a simple majority rule is used. All members have preference profiles on their possible coalitions with other countries of their constituency, which serve as a base for determination of a country's power index within the constituency.
(1) The preference profile consists of a set of intensities of connection -these can be interpreted as intentions of the country i coalescing 18 with the country j, which are defined by the following criteria: (a) Regional proximity to the country j (b) Membership of the countries i and j in the international political-economic organizations outside the IMF. (2) Significance weight coefficients are ascribed to each of the abovementioned criteria, the total intensity value p ij is defined by a general additive criterion. For analysis of the current situation (see Section 4) the following weight values were used: -For regional proximity: Pr = 0.35.
-For political-economic unions: Pb = 0.65.
i. The following properties define a measure of regional proximity between countries: -For the countries with common borders with i value 1 is assigned, for those belonging to the same part of the world together with i value 0.6 is assigned, for those belonging to different parts of the world -value 0.4 is assigned.
ii. The influence of membership of the countries i and j in other political-economic unions is evaluated by the following procedure: (a) At the first step we assess the affiliation of a pair of countries to a set of political-economic blocs. -Value 0.5 is assigned to those countries belonging together to just one bloc. -Value 0.8 is assigned to those countries belonging together to just 2 blocs. -Value 1 is assigned to those countries belonging together to three or more blocs. -Value 0 is assigned to those countries not belonging together to any bloc.
(b) At the second step for countries belonging together to at least one bloc, the economic profile and the degree of integration are evaluated. To do this we add the value apprxPij, produced at the first step, to the maximum value of the economic integration E(b) of the countries of the bloc b, defined on a set of all such blocs B where the countries i and j participate together, after which the resulting sum is divided by 2. So, the formula for this partial criterion has the form:
The E(b) values are real numbers from [0, 1] that depend on the blocs considered.
The intuitive meaning of formula (4.1) can be easily seen: it is common that great international blocs de-facto have only slight influence over those relations between their members that are not connected with the global economic problems the bloc is created to deal with. Then the preference of a country related to just the fact of common participation in the same great bloc, must be less than for the case when these countries are united in a certain more local bloc.
However, we assume that for the country i belonging to a greater bloc the country j from the same bloc is still more preferable than some country k that does not at all belong to the same bloc as i.
In Section 4 an example of numerical values of the economic integration for blocs is introduced (see Table 4 .1). For raw data related to quotas and the composition of existing constituencies, information on the Executive Board from the Fund's website 19 was used, actual for March 2007.
15 As mentioned in [6] , ''The Board of Governors delegates much actual policymaking to the Executive Board and its own meetings are often therefore largely ceremonial''. See also [7] .
16 Several examples are given in [12] .
17 Note that there are 3 decision making rules used in the IMF for questions of different importance, which require a simple majority, a special majority of 70%, or a special majority of 85% for a decision to be taken. The voting quota value significantly affects the power of every country. 18 In our case this means that the country i votes in the same way as the country j. Note that some constituencies include the countries with very difficult relations between them, sometimes, even at war. However, since there are few such countries we do not use this information when forming preferences in this paper. These details are left for future work. 19 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm.
Power indices taking into account members' preferences
Let V be a constituency comprising l countries, that uses a decision making rule with a quota 20 set at q. We assume that no country is allowed to abstain from voting.
A coalition ω ⊆ V is winning if it can define the decision of V without considering the votes of other countries, i.e., the sum of its countries' votes is greater than or equals q.
A country in a winning coalition is called pivotal if the coalition ceases to be winning in case of this country's exit.
The country i is said to make a swing, if the coalition ω is losing while ω + {i} is winning.
Following [4] , to evaluate the power of every country in the Executive Board we will use the approach described below: -Consider a system of indirect voting.
-The power of each country is defined by its power in a given constituency and the power of the constituency in the Executive Board.
-The power index π is the arithmetic product of the country's power index in the constituency (i.e., the α index) and the power index of the constituency in the Executive Board.
At the constituency level we use a modification of the Penrose power index that allows for taking into account the agents' preferences to coalesce.
Assuming the preferences of each country are given in a preference profile
. . , p iN ), let us denote the average intensity of connections of the country i with other members of the same coalition ω as follows [2] .
The p ij values here are the components of P.
We introduce the average intensity of connections of other countries of the coalition with the country i in a similar way:
We will also need the mean intensity of connections within a coalition defined by
The intensity f + (i, ω) may be interpreted as the probability of the country i joining the coalition ω under the condition that this coalition has formed, based on the average intention of the country i joining each country of the coalition; this one is defined in accordance with the preference profile of the country i. Note that we do not include the agent i into the coalition when calculating f + and f − . The intensity f − (i, ω) is similar to (1) with the distinction that in (2) the preferences of other countries over i joining the coalition are considered. It may be understood as probability of the countries of the coalition ω accepting the country i.
The intensity f (ω) characterises the average intensity of relations between the countries of the coalition ω. It may be seen as probability of the coalition ω acting as a bloc, i.e. all the members of the coalition will vote in the same way. Note that when calculating the sum in the numerator of (3), for each agent i her mean intensity of connections with other members of the coalition, i.e. ω \ {i}, is evaluated.
The power index α of the country i in a constituency may be defined as:
where l is the number of countries of the constituency, v(i) is the number of votes of the agent i, q is the quota for a decision to be taken. The index can be interpreted as a ratio of the summarised intensity of potentially possible connections of i with those coalitions for which i can make a swing, to a maximum possible intensity of connections of a member of a given constituency under the condition that i is not a dictator. 22 This is an absolute power index.
20 For constituencies we assume that the simple majority rule is used for taking decisions, i.e. q is determined by 21 This is a preference profile of the country i about coalescing with any of other countries, based on the criteria defined in the previous paragraph.
22 Indeed, if the number of votes of i is greater than or equal to the quota for a decision to be taken, their preferences over coalescing with other participants lose their meaning, because i can determine the decision by them, therefore, under condition that the quota is greater than 50% of the total votes, the power of other members is always 0, and the event of i being decisive (i.e., completely define the outcome of the ballot) is a certain one. Note that in [2] there were used relative power indices, i.e., they add up to 1. Namely, the power index of the agent i was defined as
where χ j (ω) is a certain intensity function, defined, for example, by (1).
The straightforward use of relative indices (4*) in our model is inappropriate, because to evaluate the power change of the agent i caused by a transition from one constituency to another, we need to know the absolute power that does not depend on power shares of other members.
Consider a simple example showing the inappropriateness of use of relative power indices in our model. To simplify the analysis let us assume that the preferences of all agents over coalescing with each other are maximal and equal 1. Then the α power index in formula (4) is actually the Penrose index. 23 The winning coalitions and the agents that are pivotal 24 are given in Table 3 , which is less than her absolute power 10 16 in V , that is why in fact the change of constituency is not beneficial for A. , where n is the number of agents and the summation is taken over all those coalitions which are swings for the agent i. The Banzhaf power index is obtained from the Penrose index by a normalization that makes the sum of all agents' indices add up to 1:
. See also [4] .
24 Alternatively, we might consider the losing coalitions which are swings for some of the remaining agents.
It's interesting to note that under the assumptions made the constituency W is beneficial for the agents B ,C , D : in W the absolute power of each of them is , and it does not change in the new constituency W :
, at the same time, the total votes of W would increase by those of the agent A.
Moreover, under the assumptions of the agents' maximal preferences to coalesce, the absolute index α has a simple probabilistic basis, which stipulates for its greater adequacy in assessing the power changes after transitions between constituencies. Indeed, the assumption about equal and maximally possible preferences of the agents means they vote independently of each other. It is in turn equivalent to the statement that the probability of each agent to vote ''aye'', bearing in mind that the agent's relation to the decision being taken is not considered in the model, is the same and equals 1/2. It can also be shown that in this case the number of elementary outcomes for the event D : ''A is decisive'', equals the doubled number of swings for A while the total number of possible outcomes of a ballot with n voters is 2 n ; therefore the Penrose index, which coincides with α in the case considered, is the probability of the event D, i.e. A's ''real'' power.
The problem of probabilistic characterisation of the power indices taking into account agents' preferences to coalesce is still an open one. However, it seems reasonable that for any case the absolute indices, as they give account of the size of the voting body, will measure the voting power more accurately than the relative ones thereby allowing for comparisons between different voting bodies. 25 At the level of the Executive Board let us define the power of a constituency in the probabilistic context. We will write down the probability for the constituency V to vote ''aye'' formally as
In other words, assume that each winning coalition has a certain degree of inner consolidation, defined by the function f (ω), and the greater its value the more such coalition is probable to form.
26
Now we define the power index in the Executive Board as probability of the constituency V to be decisive. The procedure is as follows:
(1) Out of the set of all possible divisions between constituencies into two coalitions of those voting ''aye'' and ''no'' select those where one of the coalitions is a swing for V . Any such division is a tuple W = V 1 , . . . , V M where V K denotes the position of a respective constituency in the given division:
(2) For each division chosen at the previous step, find the probability that this division occurs as a product of probabilities of the events that each constituency K , K = V votes ''aye'' (respectively ''no'') according to the structure of the chosen division.
27
(3) Having added up all the probabilities found at the previous step, we get the probability 28 of the event of the constituency V being decisive.
29
Note that the assumption of independent voting of different constituencies used at step (2) , means that we reject the possibility of constituencies considered as agents to form alliances. The reason for it may be the need to somehow aggregate the preferences of members of the constituencies to give account of agents' preferences to form alliances. 30 Such aggregation seems inadequate for the preference factors considered because of diversity of countries of a constituency.
As a quota for the decision making process at the Executive Board level we use the value defined in Section 3.2 (see footnote 20). Recall also that a constituency has the number of votes which equals the sum of votes of the countries comprising this constituency.
We define an absolute power index for each constituency V of the Executive Board as
25 Indeed, a relative power index can only show a share of power a member has in a given voting body. It is well known, though, that an increase in the power share does not necessarily mean an increase in power; as the previous example shows, it also depends on the size of the body. Informally, an actor might get a greater power share, but the event of her being decisive may be less probable than in a body where her power share is lesser.
26 Note that formula (5) is a modified ''The Power of the Body to Act'' (PTA) power index, introduced by Coleman with the distinction that in PTA f (ω) = 1 for all coalitions. More details about relation between the Coleman and Banzhaf indices are in [5] . 27 The divisions differ from each other by their participants' positions (whether they vote ''aye'' or ''no''). We would also like to emphasise that all constituencies vote independently by our assumptions and we have already defined the probabilities of each constituency to vote ''aye'' or ''no'' (see (5)). 28 Note that in probabilistic terms the events of formation of different coalitions are disjoint and their sum is a certain event -a voting outcome.
29 Note also that the probability of the constituency V itself to vote ''aye'' or ''no'' does not matter, as by definition V will be decisive regardless of how it votes. 30 Under the condition that an Executive Director of the constituency must take into account the opinions of all the countries of this constituency, and not only that of their own country. In practice, however, this is not always the case (see, for example, [11] ), which may require the preferences to be taken into account for the indices at the level of the Executive Board as well. In this case one can consider the preferences of the constituencies as preferences between the countries of the EDs of such constituencies.
where W are the divisions selected at step (1), and
The probabilities p K are defined by formula (5), and P(K votes no) = 1 − P(K votes aye). Now for each country i of the constituency K the total power index is a product of α and κ, i.e. π (i, V ) = α(i)κ(V ).
(7)
A remark on computational complexity. The direct calculation algorithm enumerates all subsets of a given set and checks whether the subset is a swing for each agent. If this is the case, the value of the power index is updated.
Thus, the exponential complexity of the direct algorithm substantially restricts its applicability -usually the number of agents must not exceed 30. A need for other computational methods arises if there are more actors in an institution (for example, the Board of Governors of the IMF comprises 185 countries).
This paper deals with the abovementioned restriction via the introduction of the system of indirect ballots where the maximum constituency size is 24 countries 31 while the total number of Executive Directors in the Executive Board is also 24. Additional complexity arises because of the very large number of votes (2207 764 in total) and quite non-uniform distribution of votes between the members, which produces certain restrictions on use of other computational methods, for instance, the method of generating functions.
Transitions between constituencies
A transition may be justified by a change of quotas that has led to a change of power. We assume that for a transition to be possible the following conditions must be met:
• The index π of the country i (the country's absolute power) will not decrease as a result of a transition to another constituency B, whereas the α power index increases.
• The absolute power of any country of the constituency B will not decrease. As a criterion that the countries of the constituency B will accept the country i, we propose to use the average intensity of connections of other members of the constituency with i: the function f
The analysis of potentially possible transitions between constituencies, which are beneficial for the moving countries, is left for future research.
The analysis of actual voting power distribution within the Fund based on the power indices considered
As part of the model evaluation, we conducted a voting power analysis in the Executive Board for March 2007. The authors' program Pwr_Calc was used to perform calculation of power indices. The computations were done during a two-stage process:
• First, for each country of all constituencies the α index was calculated by formula (4). In addition, the probability for every constituency to vote ''aye'' was calculated by formula (5).
• Next, the power indices κ for constituencies and total countries' power indices π were found by formulae (6) and (7), respectively.
Finally, for every country we found three indices, indicating its power in the Board under the majority rules considered (see Section 3).
Then we carried out the analysis of stability under small variations of weight coefficients. To do this, the countries' indices α and π were calculated in 50 trials, in which the weight coefficient (see Section 3) Pb was defined by a random variable with a uniform distribution over [0.4..0.85], whereas the Pr coefficient was normalised accordingly so that Pr + Pb = 1.
The indices produced by the method above were compared with the ones of the model case, where Pb was 0.65, and
The comparison showed that for the obtained values of the Pb coefficient, the maximum mean deviation of the value of the power index α from the initial value of the power index for all countries was at most 1.98%, while for the π indices, the same maximum deviation did not exceed tenths of a percent. This result means a rather good stability of the proposed indices to small variations in the weight coefficients values.
The definition of the countries' preferences based on the selected criteria
The preferences related to the regional proximity were found according to the rule proposed in Section 3 by means of a political world map.
To define the preferences about the political-economic blocs we chose the organisations listed in Table 4 .1. Those are the main international political-economic blocs currently functioning. The resulting preferences for each country were defined by a weighted sum of the partial preferences based on the selected criteria with the weight coefficients Pr = 0.35 and Pb = 0.65 for regional and economic criteria, respectively.
31 For the so-called ''Francophone Africa constituency'' (denoted below by Central-African Constituency). 
Main results
The calculated values for all countries are given in the Appendix. The increase of the quota for a decision to be taken (from a simple majority to a qualified majority of 85%) lessens the absolute power of all constituencies. It is interesting to note that the USA have the maximum absolute power under both a simple majority and a majority of 70% rules, but under the majority of 85% the Dutch Constituency takes the lead.
We suppose that there are two reasons for this fact: first, the Dutch Constituency acquires most of its power because of its votes; second, due to its probability to vote ''aye'' of about 0.246, it also makes less possible an appearance of winning coalitions organized by other members. From Table 4 .2 it is seen that for a simple majority case, the Penrose index is always greater than κ, therefore the Banzhaf index (the normalised Penrose index) is virtually always less than the κ power index (except for the USA, where the Banzhaf index is greater by almost 4.5%).
It is due to the fact that during computation of the Penrose power index, all coalitions are assumed equiprobable, i.e., each member' probabilities to vote ''aye'' or ''no'' are the same and equal 0.5. In this case each swing for a member adds 1 2 n−1 to the total value of the index. For the κ power index, however, each swing for a member adds the product of probabilities of those voting ''aye'' and those voting ''no'' to the total value. As these probabilities are generally different, their product 32 Indeed, the power of other members defined as the probability that coalitions which are swings for them will be formed, decreases if the Dutch Constituency also belongs to such coalitions (i.e., is supposed to vote ''aye'') due to a small probability of this event. For the constituencies of one country, this probability is set at 0.5, according to the general approach of voting power not concerning the individual decisions to be made. Calculations show that on average, each swing ''invests'' less for the total power for the κ power index in comparison with the Penrose one, affecting the resulting value, which is also less. When normalising it becomes apparent in the increase in the US power share, which in turn decreases the power shares of all other members. Table 4 .3 shows that the abovementioned relation between the Penrose and κ indices also holds for the quota for a decision to be taken set at 70%; the Penrose index here decreases by 69.23% on average while the κ index decreases by 95.14%. There is a certain distinction for normalised indices: now the Banzhaf index is greater than the normalised κ index not only for the US, but also for Japan, Germany, France, the UK, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the Argentinean Constituency.
In fact, to find out when the Banzhaf index is greater than the normalised κ index it suffices to construct for a member a ratio r 1 of the Penrose index to the absolute κ index, as well as the ratio r 2 of the sum of all the Penrose indices to the sum of all κ indices. Then, for a member with r 1 > r 2 , the Banzhaf power index is greater 33 than the normalised κ one. Table 4 .4 shows the further decrease of the Penrose and κ indices as the quota for a decision to be taken increases up to 85%. The Penrose index lessens on average by 97.78 %, while the κ one -by 99.74% compared with the previous case (Table 4. 3).
The normalised indices show various dynamics: the Banzhaf power index increases for most participants, except for the countries appointing their EDs and the Belgium Constituency; at the same time, the normalised index κ decreases for 9 members and increases for all the other ones, and the maximum index value of 7.1636% is that of the Netherlands Constituency.
Turning to the analysis of the α power indices at the constituency level, note that taking into account agents' preferences almost always 34 decreases the value of this index compared to the similar Penrose index. Indeed, it follows from (4) that for the α index to reach the value of the Penrose index, we need to have maximally possible preferences (equal 1) for all countries, which is not seen in reality. From all constituencies we may pick out those having a ''dictator'', 35 i.e., a country with the number of votes exceeding 50% of all votes of a constituency. 36 For such countries both the α and Penrose indices equals 1. For all other countries in such constituencies the α power index, as well as the Penrose one equals 0 they can not make a swing. 37 Besides, the absolute power indices may be 0 for a country even when the constituency has not a ''dictator'', but the number of votes of this country does not allow it to make a single swing. 38 An example can be found in the Sweden Constituency, where the power index of Estonia is 0.
33 It is obvious:
⇔ β(i) > κ(i), where the subscript symbol 'a' means absolute value of a power index.
34 Except for the two extreme cases: a country with zero power and a dictator country, see below.
35 These are, namely, Italian, Canadian, Swiss, Brazilian and Indian constituencies.
36 Note that our analysis was made under the assumption that all constituencies use a simple majority rule. The power distribution can be qualitatively different under some other decision making rule. However, our approach seems reasonable at least because of the statement from Articles of Agreement, Article XII, Section 3(f) about the re-elections of an Executive Director, performed by a simple majority voting. 37 There are 41 countries in total with zero voting power, mostly developing ones (see Appendix).
38 Compare with Luxembourg from Example 1. 
This preference matrix is symmetric due to the selected criteria so that the values from the lower part are omitted.
In other cases the values of the α power index are non-zero, but depending on the constituency structure may be very close to zero for some countries. Table 4 .5 shows an example for the Netherlands Constituency. Table 4 .5 shows that the Netherlands have the maximal power (about 0.5449), while the power of all other countries does not exceed 10 −3 . Such small power is mostly determined by the fact that the Netherlands have 49.21% of the total votes of their constituency; however one should also consider the preference matrix of the constituency members 39 (Table 4 .6), analysis of which could explain the difference in power between the countries with about the same number of votes.
Note that the possible number of swings for all countries except the Netherlands is two 40 ; for the case of the Netherlands this value is 2046. So, the difference in power between countries with the same number of possible swings is completely predetermined by their preferences; mainly about coalescing with the Netherlands as this country is pivotal in almost all winning coalitions.
Thus, for example, the power of Georgia is about 1.87 times greater than that of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Georgia's preferences over coalescing with the Netherlands are 0.535, while the similar preferences of Bosnia and Herzegovina only reach 0.21. On the other hand, Cyprus has the preferences over coalescing with the Netherlands equal 0.79, and hence its power is 1.19 times greater than that of Georgia.
As we have already mentioned, the proposed indices are stable relative to the selected weight coefficients of the partial preferences, therefore the results given in the Appendix hold even for the modified assumptions about the members' preferences, which does not differ too much from the case under study.
Conclusions
The paper introduces an analysis framework for the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, allowing definition of the members' preference-based voting power. For Fund members we have found their preferences to coalesce based on their regional proximity as well as mutual participation in political-economic organizations outside the IMF. The power indices taking into account these preferences are calculated for the three cases of a quota value for a decision to be taken.
The analysis of our results was carried out, and that showed the adequacy of the main model assumptions; the stability of the proposed power indices against the small variations of the weight coefficients of the members' partial preferences; the logically sound differences between the proposed indices and the classical Penrose and Banzhaf power indices. a The titles of the constituencies are formed from the names of the countries, providing the Executive Directors for these constituencies. The five countries with the largest quotas (the USA, Japan, Germany, France, the UK) appoint their Executive Directors. Three countries (China, Saudi Arabia, Russia), having the number of votes sufficient to elect the Executive Director without the need for creating a constituency, in effect, also appoint their Directors. Therefore the α power indices for these countries, as well as for those countries with the number of votes exceeding 50% of the total votes in a constituency, equal 1.
b The countries, which did not participate in the elections due to suspension of the voting rights, or other reasons, are not listed in the table.
